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he primary goal of tax systems is to raise rev-
enue for government so that it can perform its
public functions, but the various systems of taxation,
which reach deeply into the intricate financial net-
work of industrial, commercial and personal deci-
sion-making, can also simultaneously deliver sub-
stantive signals.Greening the tax code can allow gov-
ernment to harness its fiscal structure to help achieve
its environmental goals.It can target the key pressure
points where the tax system intersects with financial-
ly sensitive decisions that can significantly affect
behavior. Although the concept of environmentally
oriented tax instruments is not new (Irwin and Liroff
1974), today’s focus on climate change has created
new momentum for examining the ways that tax
instruments can reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Green tax theory
There are two sides to the proverbial coin of the
green tax theory – tax increases that discourage
activities or commodities that are environmentally
damaging and tax decreases that encourage those
that are environmentally beneficial. In both
instances, the tax instruments should be based on
traditional tax principles that consider issues of equi-
ty, economic effect and administrative feasibility, but
they also are grounded on an additional principle –
the environmental impact of the tax instrument.
A green tax increase can have an environmental
impact in an economically efficient way under one of
several,sometimes overlapping theories.Early in the
twentieth century, A.C. Pigou first presented the
concept that taxes could capture the costs of private
activities that otherwise would be borne by society
and apply them to the activities generating the costs
(Pigou 1920, 168). By internalizing those external
costs (although Pigou did not use those terms), a tax
could reflect the real environmental cost of the activ-
ity and build that cost into private-sector decision-
making.A related theory is the polluter pays princi-
ple, which started primarily as a prohibition against
government subsidies of pollution control measures
(OECD 1972) but frequently is presented as some-
thing akin to the cost-internalization principle
(OECD 1992). The concept of least-cost abatement
provides another rationale:by avoiding the one-size-
fits-all approach of some regulation,tax increases set
to achieve the desired degree of aggregate pollution
reduction can allow individual polluters to decide
when it is economically efficient for them to abate
pollution (Surrey 1973, 156). Finally, the double-div-
idend theory (Pearce 1991, 940), also known as eco-
logical tax reform (von Weizsäcker and Jesinghaus
1992,18),would use the revenue raised under any of
these theories to reduce some existing tax burden,
such as taxes on labor that may be dampening the
economy.The environmental tax would produce the
first – environmental – dividend, and the tax relief
would produce the second – economic – dividend
(Milne 2003, 10–12).
All these theories share, in general terms, the idea
that adjusting the economic calculation can result in
more environmentally beneficial and economically
efficient results. Few green tax increases perfectly
execute these theories,given challenges such as iden-
tifying and enacting the exact external cost for inter-
nalization,but the theories guide the design and cer-
tainly contribute heavily to the political rhetoric sur-
rounding their enactment.
Green tax decreases have a more pragmatic founda-
tion. By awarding a tax credit, deduction, exemption
or reduced tax rate that otherwise would not be
available, government finds a way to encourage an
environmentally positive commodity or activity.The
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primary motivation is to achieve a given environ-
mental benefit by subsidizing activities that other-
wise would not occur, not to make the market more
economically efficient or rational. If costs were fully
internalized, the demand for these measures might
decline.
Green tax decreases also have a very different fiscal
effect than tax increases,obviously reducing the flow
of revenues to the government rather than increas-
ing it. This difference can have significant political
consequences. Tax increases are often politically
unpopular, unless accompanied by offsetting tax
relief, while constituents may welcome tax cuts from
which they can benefit. For politicians, tax cuts may
also offer the opportunity to deliver benefits more
quietly through the tax code than through the con-
spicuous scrutiny of the annual appropriations
process. However, as Stanley Surrey explained when
he coined the term “tax expenditure”, targeted tax
incentives have the same fiscal impact as direct
appropriations and,in fact,are government expendi-
tures (Surrey 1973, 3–4).
Green tax increases in action
Both the European Union and the United States put
their toes into the green tax waters in the early 1990s
when they proposed broad-based energy taxes.
Although they found the water too chilly, their pro-
posals capture key political and policy issues
involved in using green taxes to address climate
change.
From an environmental perspective,the ideal green
tax for climate change would be a tax on the carbon
content of fossil fuels.When combusted, the carbon
in the fuel produces the carbon dioxide that
increases the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Taxing the carbon would help internalize external
costs and cause the polluter to pay. The taxes that
were proposed, however, did not follow the pure
carbon tax model.
In 1992, the European Commission proposed a rev-
enue-neutral tax based half on carbon content and
half on energy value (European Commission 1992).
Thus, it extended the tax to non-carbon fuel sources
such as nuclear power and hydropower, recognizing
in part the fact that a carbon tax alone would have
disparate impacts on the competitive position of dif-
ferent member states (European Commission 1991).
It also provided some tax relief for energy-intensive
industries, recognizing that competitiveness con-
cerns had to somewhat temper the environmental
goal. Even so, energy-intensive industries resisted
the tax, as did some member states that were hesi-
tant to accept a tax system that, for the first time,
would have imposed rates unified at the Community
level (Boeshertz and Rosenstock 2003, 152–53;
European Commission 1992). As part of a deficit-
reduction package in 1993, the Clinton Admini-
stration proposed a federal tax based solely on ener-
gy content,realizing the regional and economic diffi-
culties of imposing a carbon tax on coal, but the tax
still fell under political pressure from opponents (US
Treasury 1993).As these accounts illustrate,the envi-
ronmental principle underlying green taxes will not
automatically trump the policy principle that looks
at economic effect, and few taxes are immune from
political considerations. Nevertheless, these taxes, if
enacted, would have represented the first interna-
tionally significant steps toward using fiscal policy on
a global scale to increase the cost of a broad range of
fossil fuels, well beyond the longstanding taxes on
transportation fuels.
Broad-based energy or carbon taxes need not occur
only at the highest levels. In the early 1990s,
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden introduced
carbon taxes, and recent studies of the effect of their
carbon-energy taxes on the industrial sector have
found that the taxes have reduced carbon dioxide
emissions (Speck et al. 2006, 217–20). Other coun-
tries have acted as well. For example, Germany
began phasing in a tax on energy products and elec-
tricity in 1999, and two years later the United
Kingdom imposed a climate change levy on electric-
ity and fossil fuels used outside the household sector
as part of a larger program to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions by 20 percent by 2010 (European Environ-
ment Agency 2005, 52–53).
Support continues to grow for the market-based
approach. The Stern Review in late 2006 under-
scored the importance of attaching a price to car-
bon emissions, whether by tax, trading regime or
regulation (Stern 2006,xviii),and in March 2007 the
European Commission issued a Green Paper to
launch a discussion on increasing the use of market-
based instruments,including green taxes,in Europe.
In line with the approach it proposed in 1992, the
European Commission again has suggested that
fuels should be taxed according to both their ener-
gy content and their greenhouse gas emissions(European Commission 2007, 2 and 7). Although
the United States has not taken any significant
steps toward broad-based energy taxation since
1993, two members of Congress have introduced
legislation proposing carbon taxes, and one presi-
dential candidate has called for carbon tax.
This thumbnail sketch of history cannot do justice to
the details, but it provides some evidence of the his-
torical and continued interest in broad-based energy
taxes. It would be a mistake, however, to think only
of energy-based taxes when considering how green
tax increases can reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
For example, a tax on gas guzzler cars in the United
States rises as high as USD 7,700 for cars with fuel
economy of less than 12.5 miles per gallon, although
its effectiveness has been constrained by a loophole
for sport utility vehicles,which were not on the draw-
ing boards when the tax was enacted.Norway impos-
es a tax on perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and hydrofluo-
rocarbons (HFCs) based on their contribution to the
greenhouse effect (European Environment Agency
2005, 59). The tax approach is fungible. It is only a
matter of finding and defining a tax base that gener-
ates greenhouse gas emissions and then of imposing
a tax on that base to internalize costs or achieve the
desired change in behavior.
Green tax decreases in action
In the climate change arena,green tax decreases can
send targeted,positive price signals that can increase
the use of renewable energy and improve energy
efficiency in an effort to reduce reliance on fossil
fuels.These decreases can take the form of tax cred-
its, deductions, exemptions or reduced tax rates that
otherwise would not be available under neutral prin-
ciples of taxation.
The United States in recent years has chosen to use
tax expenditures rather than tax increases to pursue
these ends.For example,since 1992,the producers of
electricity from wind power have been able to claim
an income tax credit (now USD 2.0 cents) for each
kilowatt hour of electricity they sell. As a result of
legislation enacted in 2005, purchasers of cars pow-
ered by alternative fuels may be eligible for an
income tax credit; businesses that make energy effi-
ciency improvements in their buildings can claim a
tax deduction of up to USD 1.80 per square foot;
manufacturers of energy-efficient refrigerators,
dishwashers and clothes washers can claim an
income tax credit ranging from $125 to $175 per
machine produced during 2006 and 2007,depending
on the type of machine, degree of energy efficiency,
and level of production beyond historical levels.
Many of these incentives have limited life spans,tar-
geting the transitional time for the new technology
and reducing the long-term fiscal impact.
The United States is certainly not alone in the use of
tax expenditures to address climate change. To cite
just a few examples, the United Kingdom offers land-
lords an income tax deduction of up to GBP 1,500 per
property for the installation of insulation in residen-
tial properties they lease, and the province of British
Columbia in Canada exempts energy efficient fur-
naces from its sales tax (OECD 2007,108 and 111).In
the transportation sector, Sweden has offered tax
benefits to employees whose compensation includes
employer-provided vehicles using alternative fuels
(European Environment Agency 2005, 109).
However, the United States has had greater freedom
to use tax expenditures than the European member
states, because it has nothing comparable to the Eu-
ropean Union’s state aid rules,which impose a formal
discipline on the circumstances in which member
states can provide tax subsidies for environmental
protection (European Commission 2001).In addition,
the federal budget rules in the United States requir-
ing that tax bills must be revenue neutral lapsed from
2002 to 2007, allowing the federal government to
enact green tax decreases without having to find off-
setting revenues to pay for them. The Energy Policy
Act of 2005 carried a five-year price tag of $15 billion
in tax expenditures for energy, some environmentally
positive, and some environmentally negative (Joint
Committee on Taxation 2005).
One should not leave the topic of tax expenditures
without noting at least in passing that another way to
green the tax system is to eliminate or reduce exist-
ing tax subsidies for fossil fuels and other commodi-
ties that contribute to greenhouse gas emissions.
Removing those tax (and non-tax) subsidies can take
one step toward correcting prices, even if one does
not continue down the path toward fully internaliz-
ing external costs.
When to use green taxes for climate change
Tax instruments are just a means to an end, in this
case reducing greenhouse gas emissions.There are no
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absolute rules governing when and how to use
green tax instruments, or whether to use the tax-
increase or tax-expenditure side of the green tax
coin, but perhaps in closing a few observations are
in order. First, when green taxes are used in the cli-
mate change context, they often serve the dual
motives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and
promoting energy security. Consequently, their pol-
icy and political foundations may not be limited to
the environmental context and their design may
reflect multiple goals.Their green may bear stripes
in other colors as well.
Second, policymakers must consider carefully the
choice between green tax instruments that send neg-
ative signals and those that send positive signals.As
a general matter, pervasive, strong, negative signals,
such as broad-based energy taxes, have the potential
to induce long-term structural and attitudinal
changes that over time will change the ways in which
business and daily life are conducted. They can
extend deep into the broad reaches of economic
decisions.On the other hand,carefully targeted,pos-
itive signals of tax expenditures may be useful to
help society over specific speed bumps of technolog-
ical change in the short term, improving the eco-
nomic viability or acceptance of new technologies
until they can compete independently.
The choice, however, does not depend just on
whether to use broad or targeted, negative or posi-
tive signals.It also rests on the fundamental question
of who should pay. Should the polluter pay, as in the
case of tax increases, or should the beneficiary (soci-
ety) pay in the case of tax expenditures? And if using
both is an option, if the negative signal is sufficiently
strong, can it accomplish most or all of the desired
result without the assistance of targeted tax expendi-
tures, leaving the full cost on the polluter? This
choice of who should pay will reflect fundamental
policy, fiscal and political decisions.
Third, as other articles have illustated, taxation is
just one of numerous ways in which government
can effect change, and a looming issue in the cli-
mate debate is the relationship between broad-
based energy taxes and permit trading regimes.
They are both market-based instruments; they both
send price signals; and they may raise similar issues
of equity and economic impact, particularly if the
permits are auctioned, not grandfathered. But they
also are different. Taxes on fossil fuels will carry a
known price, set by the tax rate, whereas the price
of permits will fluctuate with the market.Taxes will
not yield a pre-determined level of emissions’ con-
trol, whereas a properly enforced trading scheme
will achieve a known target. Taxes will carry a cost
that is more visible to voters and consumers and
therefore more politically volatile, while permit
trading may be more politically opaque to the gen-
eral public. Both policy and political calculations
will govern the choice, but the choice need not be
limited to one or the other.The two may operate in
concert,for example,by using different instruments
for different sectors or by using taxes in conjunc-
tion with permits that are not auctioned. Govern-
ment can use more than one type of green coin in
its purse of market-based options.
Finally, the question of who decides which coin to
use – a question that has more novel implications in
the case of tax instruments. Within many govern-
ments, tax matters are handled in the first instance
by the tax writers and tax administrators and envi-
ronmental matters by those involved primarily in
environmental protection, but green taxation is
built in the hybrid world that combines the disci-
plines of taxation, environmental protection, and
economics. Tax specialists become environmental
specialists; environmental regulators need to incor-
porate the role of taxation in their universe; and
economists should inform the analysis. This broad-
ening may require the development of enhanced
expertise and different forms of collaboration, and
the plot may thicken with jockeying for control
over potential new revenue streams. It may also be
constrained by institutional limits, such as the
European Union’s unanimity rule, which requires
that all member states agree before a tax can be
implemented at the Community level. The chal-
lenges of climate change demand new solutions and
interdisciplinary expertise, and, as demonstrated by
experience to date, the well-matched pervasiveness
of greenhouse gas emissions and tax systems offers
significant opportunities for the future.
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